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INTRODUCTION
F. HODGE O'NEAL*
It is with pride and confidence that I recommend this issue of the
Washington University Law Quarterly to readers interested in corpora-
tion and business law. The editors of the Quarterly have done a
splendid job of assembling for this issue a number of timely, useful,
scholarly and well-written articles.
One of the most important and difficult issues in developing corpora-
tion law is whether, and if so, under what circumstances, directors not
charged in a derivative action, and supposedly independent and disin-
terested, can terminate the derivative action by determining, in the ex-
ercise of their business judgment, that terminating the action is in the
corporation's best interests. In recent years, it has become a common
practice for a corporation's board of directors, faced with the derivative
action seeking to impose liability on some of the directors or officers, to
designate a special litigation committee composed of disinterested, in-
dependent directors to investigate the alleged wrongful conduct and de-
termine whether continuing the litigation is in the corporation's best
interests. The special committee is generally provided with a distin-
guished former judge or a prominent lawyer as special counsel to assist
with the investigation. Most judicial decisions passing on a special liti-
gation committee's determination that a derivative action should be
terminated hold that judicial scrutiny of the committee's decision is
sharply restricted by the business judgment rule.
The Quarterly is indeed fortunate to have two of the most able,
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thoughtful and articulate commentators in the country address the
question of what role a court should play in reviewing a decision of
disinterested directors or a litigation committee to terminate a deriva-
tive action. The lead Article in this issue, entitled The Business Judg-
ment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits: A View from the Inside is
authored by Richard W. Duesenberg, Vice President, General Counsel
and Secretary of Monsanto Company. The Article defends an expan-
sive application of the business judgment rule to decisions by disinter-
ested directors and litigation committees.' Drawing on his extensive
experience in a large corporate law department and his long-term inter-
est in and study of corporate governance problems, Mr. Duesenberg
urges that the business judgment rule, as used to dismiss derivative ac-
tions, should not be so encumbered by restrictions as to destroy its vi-
tality.2 He points out that an expansive application of the rule avoids
the cost, time, and loss of attention to business that litigation demands
and provides a speedy process for settling the controversies. 3
In a Commentary on the Duesenberg Article, Robert W. Hamilton,
Benno C. Schmidt Professor of Law at the University of Texas and
John S. Lehmann Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law during the
spring 1982 semester at Washington University, has a different point of
view of how the business judgment rule should be applied to decisions
of disinterested directors to terminate shareholder litigation. Professor
Hamilton believes that the derivative suit provides an important con-
trol over corporate conduct. He asserts that "some kind of judicial con-
trol has to be imposed on the otherwise unlimited power of litigation
committees to dismiss derivative litigation."4 He sees the fundamental
substantive issue as being "whether corporate management (broadly
defined) should be given complete and essentially unreviewable discre-
tion to decide which claims or breach of fiduciary duty may be investi-
gated by the adversary judicial system and which may not."5 The
problem, he states, is "to articulate a middle ground, which encourages
courts to accept reasonable business decisions not to pursue litigation
without binding them to accept all such decisions in all cases merely on
1. Duesenberg, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits.- A Vieipfrom
the Inside, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 311 (1982).
2. Id. at 343.
3. Id.
4. Hamilton, Commentary, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 347, 357 (1982).
5. Id. at 354.
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the basis that minimum procedural requirements were followed." 6
Professor Hamilton notes that the draft American Law Institute
study on Corporate Governance follows a path blazed by the Supreme
Court of Delaware in the Maldonado decision 7 in recommending that a
court should exercise its own independent judgment to evaluate
whether the justification for dismissal given by a litigation committee is
outweighed by other considerations relating to the corporation's best
interests. He also discusses an article by two practicing lawyers8 which
takes the position that in some extraordinary cases the courts should do
more than require good faith, independence and due care on the part of
directors deciding to terminate a shareholder action. The courts should
examine the merits of the directors' decision to ascertain whether their
decision was within the bounds of a reasonable exercise of discretion.
Professor Hamilton concludes that this intermediate position has much
to recommend it.
Much more will undoubtedly be said on this subject before courts,
legislatures and commentators reach anything approaching a consen-
sus. In the meantime, the issues are sharply drawn and ably discussed
in Mr. Duesenberg's Article and Professor Hamilton's Commentary.
Two Chicago practitioners, Jonathan T. Howe and Leland J. Badger,
offer a valuable discussion of antitrust problems involved in "product
certification," which the authors define as "a process of product evalua-
tion, including testing and analysis, administered and managed by a
third-party certification agency. It allows manufacturers to attest that
their products satisfy the applicable standards and related procedural
requirements of the certification program."9 The Article, entitled The
Antitrust Challenge to Nonprofit Certjfcation Organizations: Conflicts of
Interest and a Practical Rule of Reason Approach to Cert//cation Pro-
grams as Industry- Wide Builders of Competition and Efficiency, dis-
cusses two important questions, namely: (1) What coherent basis exists
for viewing nonprofit certification programs as structural elements in
the marketplace hierarchy to advance urgent antitrust goals, including
increased competition and productivity? (2) Does a distinct duty exist
6. Id. at 355.
7. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (DeL 1981).
8. Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions Viva
Zapata. 37 Bus. LAW 27 (1981).
9. Howe & Badger, The Antitrust Challenge to Nonprofit Certffcation Organizations: Con-
Ihets of Interest and a Practical Rule of Reason Approach to Certfcation Programs as Industry-
Wide Builders of Competition and Efficiency. 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 359, 364 (1982).
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to safeguard certification organizations against conflicts of interest that,
if met, would demonstrate that a certification organization under anti-
trust scrutiny in court should be found to be without conspiratorial in-
tent.10 The authors conclude that:
the unique benefits of certification programs in building industry-wide
competition and productivity can be maximized only when a practical
rule of reason approach is used to scrutinize certification organizations
charged with antitrust abuses relating to conflicts of interest of certain of
their decisionmaking representative members. Defining a distinct duty of
certification organizations to provide safeguards against conflicts of inter-
est, and the means to meet that duty, represents a step forward in the
exposition of such a practical rule of reason approach."
During the last decade there has been a great deal of interest in crim-
inal prosecution of corporations and their officers and directors. This
increased interest is due in considerable part to a perceived need for
effective mechanisms to regulate corporate behavior. In a fascinating
Article, titled Corporate CriminalAccountability: 4 Brief History and an
Observation, Kathleen F. Brickey, Professor of Law, Washington Uni-
versity, traces the historical development of corporate criminal liability
in England and in this country. By artfully weaving apt quotations
from judicial opinions into her text, Professor Brickey not only pro-
vides the reader with an accurate and concise statement of the changes
in doctrine as they took place but also imparts something of the flavor
of the times in which the judges were speaking.
Professor Brickey notes that "the early doctrine through which cor-
porations and their managers were held criminally liable developed
with little or no heed to traditional notions of culpability. . . . Corpo-
rate criminal liability was, then, at the outset, strict liability. Only in
the relatively recent past did we stray from the strict liability model of
corporate criminality to a mens rea model."' 2 Professor Brickey con-
cludes that historical facts suggest "that recognition of corporate crimi-
nal accountability constituted a more effective response to problems
created by corporate business activities than did existing private reme-
dies" 3 and that when "institutional and managerial liability for regula-
tory offenses is placed in historical perspective there seems little reason
10. Id. at 360.
11. Id. at 393.
12. Brickey, Corporate CriminalAccountability: . Brief History and Observation, 60 WASH.
U.L.Q. 395, 423-24 (1982).
13. Id. at 425.
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to fret over what has been cast as an 'extraordinary expansion of the
legal concept of corporate crime.' "14 The common-law of corporate
criminal liability, she says, "was wholly unconcerned with moral blame
and only partly concerned with punishment." 15
14. Id.
IS. Id.
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